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Reservation for Rights of Way for Canals and Ditches in Favor of United
States Over Former Public Lands of the United States
West of the 100th Meridian
By CHARLES

. BEISE*

On October 2, 1888,' Federal funds were appropriated for the
survey of western lands for reservoirs, ditches, and canals and all sites
were reserved from entry and sale. As a result of the Attorney General's
ruling of May 27, 1890, that no land west of the 100th meridian could
be entered until such survey was made, Congress determined to repeal
that portion of the act, 2 and the surviving portion of the 1888 Act,
together with the 1890 Act are codified today as 43 U. S. C. 662, 43
U. S. C. 945. However, it still retains the following provision:
That in all patents for lands hereafter taken up under any
of the land laws of the United States or on entries or claims validated by this act, west of the one hundredth meridian, it shall be
expressed that there is reserved from the lands in said patent described a right of way thereon for ditches or canals constructed by
the authority of the United States.
The provision granting a free canal right of way to Uncle Sam has been
extensively utilized in the past and will be increasingly used in the
future as the trend of reclamation projects swings from creation of a
primary water supply for raw public lands, to development of supplemental waters for existing irrigated areas.3
All those lands taken up under any of the public land laws of the
United States subsequent to October 2, 1888, are subject to rights of
way for ditches or canals constructed by authority of the United States,4
and since a large proportion of western lands have been entered after that
date the reservation accordingly affects a vast acreage west of the 1 00th
meridian in private ownership.
*Of the Denver bar.
125 Stat., 505.
'Act of August 30, 1890, 26 Stat., 371.
'By far the greater number of irrigation projects now investigated by the Bureau
of Reclamation for post-war construction concern themselves with "firming up" present
hazardous irrigation water supplies. Municipal water demands likewise call for construction work in settled areas. The same is true of hydro-electric developments. Necessarily more and more people will be affected by the exercise of this canal right reserved
to the United States.
'General Land Office circular of July 25, 1903.
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The practitioner's acquaintance with the 1890 Act ordinarily arises
when his client presents him with a notice issued by the Bureau of Reclamation which is customarily mailed out by registered mail. s There is
nothing in the act which limits its exercise to the Bureau of Reclamation
and it is possible that the Department of Agriculture, th United States
Indian Service, the Grazing Service or the Fish and Wildlife Service
might have some projects under which these rights can be claimed. 6 On
January 27, 1943, the Assistant Secretary of the Interior approved a
decision by the Solicitor of that Department whereby it was held that
Indian Reservations created subsequent to October 2, 1888, are subject
to this right of way in favor of the United States, and on August 9,
1943, the Assistant Secretary of the Interior approved his Solicitor's
opinion that the right of way reserved by the Act of August 30, 1890
(26 Stat. 391) may be used to convey water for domestic purposes to
National Parks and Monuments.
The first decisions to arise under the act presented the contention
of the landowner that the reservation in favor of the United States was
limited to existing canals at the time of the passage of the act and that
'The right of way notice is in the following form:
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Bureau of Reclamation
...................... .................... Irrigatio n P ro ject
RIGHT OF WAY NOTICE
..........................................................

- --

-

(Date)

It is understood that you have an interest in the land described as -------------------Section ------------. T -----------R .....
... M ............
and that the United States has an
interest in the same land because it was entered after October 2, 1888, and is accordingly subject to the following provision of law:
"That in all patents for lands hereafter taken up under any of the land
laws of the United States or on entries or claims validated by this act west of
the one hundredth meridian, it shall be expressed that there is reserved from
the lands in said patent described a right of way thereon for ditches or canals
constructed by the authority of the United States." (Act of Aug. 30, 1890,
26 Stat., 391.)
Under the Act of June 17, 1902 (32 Stat., 388), and related enactments the
United States is advancing large sums of money for irrigation work in the West, creating much larger values in the lands benefited.. Operations have reached the point where
such work calls for the use of the right of way reserved to the United States across the
land described above. The purpose of this letter is to notify you and any others interested in the land that the United States is about to utilize its right of way across the
land. If desired, the project office will be glad to answer questions or give more definite
information concerning the location of the proposed ditch or canal, etc.
Very respectfully,
Project Superintendent.
No statutory requirement of mailing or giving this notice exists. It is a matter
of policy, however, to mail it.
'There are no decisions of courts, of the Land Department, or administrative rulings extant where any other agency other than the Bureau of Reclamation is involved.
See also note 40, and last quotation in this article.
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prospective or future canals were without the scope of the legislation."
The court determined that the legislation was applicable to canals to be
constructed by the government in the future, saying:
As at that time it (United States) had no ditches or canals
Congress must and could have referred only to those it intended to
construct.
The same decision in the state court" gives an excellent summary
of the legislative history of the act and apparently there was a substantial
difference of opinion in Congress concerning the act at the time of the
passage thereof, for Senator Reagan, in speaking of the reservation in
patents to be issued in the future, states:
However much may be said about the House of Representatives in resisting that, they, in my judgment, are entitled to the
profound gratitude of the American people for saving to them the
little that they have saved in this conference report.
And Senator Dolph said:
This provision, while it will be of no practical value to anyone, will be a cloud or encumbrance on every man's title who secures a portion of the public domain.
This decision likewise held that the language, "constructed by the
authority of the United States," in said act, was applicable without
reference to time of construction and that future construction was included within the scope of the act. The ruling in the Green v. Willhite
decision was affirmed again in United States v. Ide, Wyoming, 277 Fed.
373, and affirmed in 68 L. Ed. 407, so that today it has been conclusively established that the reservation was made for the benefit of future
as well as past construction and includes ditches constructed after patent
has issued as well as ditches constructed prior to issuance of patent.
It was next contended in a decision arising in Colorado, 9 in connection with the Uncompahgre Project, that the reservation in the 1890
Act was void because of an indefinite description and this contention also
was rejected by the court and the officials of the United States were held
to be authorized by the act to determine the route of the canal. 10
It is a well known fact that where irrigation is practiced extensively, the need for drainage commonly arises, and the United States
in connection with an irrigation project which required drainage claimed
that the reservation in the 1890 Act was applicable to drainage ditches; 1'
the drainage waters collected by the ditches were to be delivered to land
privately owned and outside of the boundaries of the federal project.
'Green v. Willhite, Ida. 1906, 160 Fed. 755.
'Green v. Willhite, Ida. 1908, 93 P. 971.
'U. S. v. Van Horn, 197 Fed. 611, Colo. 1912.
"See note 26 as to reasonableness of choice of route.
'Griffiths v. Cole, Ida. 264 Fed. 369.
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The court determined that drainage ditches were included within the
meaning of the act, stating:
putting it in another way, the proposed disposition of the water
is incidental to the construction and maintenance of the Boise
Project, and, therefore, the proposed canal is within the scope of
the authority conferred by law and for it the Government may
occupy rights of way under the Act of August 30, 1890, or exappropriate them by suitable condemnation proceedings.
This conclusion was subsequently affirmed in the United States v. Ide,
supra. This liberal construction of the act has been applied by courts to
the same type of legislation under other acts dealing with irrigation development and right of way for canals and ditches for private com12
panies.
The statutory right of way reserved by this Act of 1890 in favor
of the United States includes the power to straighten, widen or deepen
a natural ravine or draw to be used in the conveyance of water,12 and this
decision states that the patentees are estopped by acceptance of patent to
qtestion propriety of reservation being inserted therein. This does not
preclude the patentee from challenging the necessity of exercising the
reserved rights nor the reasonableness of the route chosen for these issues
were raised in a decision in Colorado1 4 and the court reserved judgment
upon these points until the case was finally disposed of on its merits,
indicating that the court, at least, considered the objections of the landowner. In the Ide decision, the court stated that the right in favor of the
United States must be exercised with ordinary care, otherwise damages
can be recovered, and concerning the issue of the necessity of exercising
the right, the court heard evidence and determined that the changes
sought to be made by the United States were in fact necessary. The mere
fact that the court heard evidence upon the issue indicates15 that the necessity of exercising the right was considered a proper issue.
Where a canal has been constructed by the United States under the
authority of this act and the canal is crossed by a railroad or other improvement, such crossings must be made without expense or loss to the
United States and any increased cost of maintenance of canals caused
thereby must be borne by the person crossing the same. 17
2
" See Section 18, Act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat., 1101, 43 U. S. C. 946) and
U. S. v. Big Horn Land and Cattle Company, 17 Fed. 2d 357. holding that the
words "canal" or "ditch" were used in an inclusive sense and embrace the entire project.
This holding was affirmed in Twin Falls Canal Company v. American Falls Reservoir
District No. 2, 59 Fed. 2d 19. Johnson Irrigation Company v. Ivory, 24 P. 2d 1053;
U. S. v. Tujungha Co., 48 Fed. 2d 689.
'Ide v. U. S.. Wyo., 277 Fed. 373, affd. 68 L. Ed. 407.
"United States v. Van Horn, Colo. 1912, 197 F. 611.
'See notes 30 and 31.
'7 U. S. v. Minidoka and S. W. Railroad Company, 176 Fed. 762, Aff. 59 L. Ed.
200.
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It has been the policy of the Bureau of Reclamation to interpret
the words "ditches" or "canals" to include any form of conveyance of
water, such as siphon, penstock, tunnel, drain, flume or conduit, in addition to open ditches and canals and there is ample justification for this
interpretation. Thus in Sefton v. Prentice,1s the term "conduit" as
defined by Webster was accepted by the court to mean, "a general word
which applies to any channel or structure by which flowing water can
be coanducted from one point to another. It includes a ditch, flume, pipe
or any kind of aqueduct," and in Colorado,'" Section 7 of Article 16 of
the State Constitution provides, "All persons and corporations shall
have the right of way across public, private and corporation lands for
the construction of ditches, canals and flumes for the purpose of conveying water * * *," and the court stated, concerning the condemnation of
a right of way for a pipe line:
It does not mention a pipe line but its evident object was
to permit a right of way for a conduit through which to convey
water for the purposes designated and hence the kind of conduit
employed and utilized is of no material moment so far as any
question in the case at bar is involved.
And in Washington,20 Section 16 of Article 1 of the Constitution provided that private property shall not be taken except "for drains, flumes
or ditches on or across the land of others for agriculture * * * purposes,"
and the court decided that the condemnation of a right of way for a
private pipeline was a public use and never mentions the fact that a
pipeline is being built; apparently it was assumed by all the parties involved to be beyond question. Recently in Colorado 21 in an action to
condemn a right of way for a pipeline across a placer claim, the court
affirmed its earlier decision in the Lyons case by stating, "the provisions
quoted above (Section 7, Article 16, Colorado Constitution) cover pipe
lines."
In an article in the Reclamation Era, 22 D. G. Tyree, attorney for
the bureau, concludes with the words, "ditches and canals include a tunnel," quoting Webster's definition of a "tunnel" as "a subterraneous
passage way, especially one horizontal and open at both ends, as for a
railroad, canal, drain, etc.," and the author concludes:
If a tunnel is correctly defined as a passageway for a canal,
it is evident that a canal may be an underground waterway as well
"37 P. 641, Calif. 1894.
'Town of Lyons v. City of Longmont, 129 P. 198. 1913.
eState v. Superior Court, 266 P. 198.
'Pine Martin Mining Company v. Empire Zinc Co., Colo. 1932, 11 P. 221.

"25 Reclamation Era, 246.
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as an open ditch and that3 the right of way for a tunnel is, in fact,
2
right of way for a canal.
The Federal Government has been consistent in a liberal interpretatioft of the words "ditches" and "canals," not only when it sought to
exercise a right existing in favor of the United States, but also when a
private party sought to exercise such a right across federal lands. In a
decision arising in Colorado2 4 the applicant sought a right of way for a
pipeline under the Act of March 3, 1891, which granted to private
parties rights of way for "ditches, canals or reservoirs," which request
was refused and on appeal the decision was reversed, stating:
From the foregoing authorities, it appears that the words
"canal" or "ditch" are used to designate any artificial waterway for
irrigation * * * the methods used for conveying water * * * to
the lands to be irrigated vary according to topography of the country, character of the soil, climate, permanency of the works, etc.
The purpose for which the conduit is constructed and the water
conveyed will largely control the descriptive term used and is very
material in cases arising before this Department in connection with
applications for rights of way under the several laws governing the
granting of such easements or licenses. That purpose is irrigation
and the fact that the words "reservoir, canal, and lateral" are used
in the act does not warrant the assumption that it refers to and
only authorizes the use of the rights of way granted for open canals
or laterals. On the contrary, it is the evident purpose of Congress
to grant the necessary rights of way through public lands for any
and all structures essential or necessary to the accomplishment of
the purpose of irrigation.
There are numerous states which have statutes granting to the
United States a right of way for ditches and canals across state lands and
the validity of these statutes have been challenged and sustained. 2 The
s
status of these statutes in Colorado is a bit uncertain3
'The Bureau of Reclamation has interpreted the 1890 Act to cover pipe lines,
whether above the ground or buried, including penst~cks to power plants.
'Fraser Sources Irrigation and Power Company, 43 Decisions Public Lands, 110.
'United States v. Fuiler, Ida. 1937, 20 Fed. Supp. 839.
'The present statute is found in 4 C. S. A. Chap. 134, Par. 81, and Sec. 29 of
Chap. 187 of the 1919 Session Laws, Page 651, repeals the Acts of 1905 and 1917.
but does not mention Chap. 207 of the Session Laws of 1909, which act resembles the

first statute quoted, save that attached to it was the following language:
"The right of way is hereby given -* * * to the United States to locate,
construct and maintain such roads, bridges, canals, ditches, tunnels, pipelines.
telephone and transmission lines as may be constructed for the purpose of irrigation by authority of the United States over and through any of the lands
which are now or may be the property of the State. All conveyances of State
lands hereafter shall contain a reservation of such rights of way,"
and it would therefore seem that the sentence last quoted from the 1909 Act is still in
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Although the United States has reserved the right for canals in
patents to lands issued by it, it has not exercised its right oppressively
and it has made it a policy to pay for all improvements injured or damaged by reason of the construction of the canal. This is not required by
the law. The ordinary procedure is to appraise all improvements on the
lands and to offer the landowner a sum of money which will compensate
him for the damages sustained. Thus it has been held3 2 that a contract
between employees of the Bureau of Reclamation and a contractor constructing a canal for the bureau whereby the government would assume
one-half of the cost of removing an electrical transmission line constructed upon lands subject to the Act of 1890 was not binding upon
the United States because the reservation in the patent under the Act of
1890 constituted a conveyance running with the land of which the
Power Company had notice and therefore the company could not obtain
a right of way superior to that of the United States, and, accordingly.
there is no authority for the payment from public funds for a right of
way which the United States possesses. This decision was overruled, or
at least since issuance thereof, it has been consistently distinguished.
Thus, it has been held that a landowner is entitled to damages sustained
by him through the exercise of the 1890 canal right by the United
34
States" as to any improvements owned by him, but not as to his land.
Compensation has likewise been paid by the United States for any
materials removed in the construction of the canal and utilized by the
United States in construction of some feature of the project off of the
right of way where found; 3r' likewise, where a project has been constructed for a mixed purpose, i. e., irrigation and flood control, and a
canal was built for irrigation purposes and also levees several hundred
feet on each side of the canal, compensation has been paid for the addieffect. No litigation on this point exists in Colorado. Other statutes for cooperation
with the United States will be found in Vol. 2 C. S. A. Chap. 134, Sections 68, 69.
See also the Ide decision (supra).
'7 Comp. Gen. 217. "Reclamation Service-Rights of Way."
13Albert W. C. Smith, 47 Public Lands Decisions 158, 1919.
*"The rights of the owner of an easement are paramount to the extent of the grant
or reservation to those of the owner of the soil. An easement gives to the owner thereof
all such rights as are incident or necessary to the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the
easement. Where the easement is not specifically defined, the rule is that it need be only
such as is reasonably necessary and convenient for the purpose for which it was created.
A grant or reservation of an easement in general terms is limited to a use such as is
reasonably necessary and convenient, and as little burdensome to the servient estate as
possible for the use contemplated. In other words, an unlimited conveyance of an easement is in law a grant of unlimited reasonable use. Under the above principles, it is
clear that the United States, under the reservation of the right of way contained in the
Act of August 30, 1890, has the right to use such portion of the tract entered as is
necessary for the construction, operation, and maintenance of the lateral. The United
States is not liable for damages resulting to land 'because it did that which it had a
right to do'."
'Reclamation decision July 26, 1913.
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tional area occupied by the levees and not needed for the canal, the
Comptroller General stating:"
The Act of August 30, 1890, does not specify for what
purposes the ditches and canals to be constructed by the United
States are to be used. The history of the act, however, clearly indicates that it had reference to ditches or canals to convey water for
the reclamation of arid lands by irrigation. To the extent therefore that the proposed project is for irrigation purposes alone the
title to right of way is already vested in the United States and no
payment may be made for the lands required therefor * * * for
the additional area required for flood control purposes payment
may be made at a reasonable
price not in excess of the appraised
7
value of the land involved.

Denver, Air Center of the World
BY STEADHAM ACKER

Following is a summary of remarks made by Mr. Acker, aviation
consultant for Denver, at the March 4, 1946, meeting of the Denver Bar
Association:
Aviation is transportation. It is past the stage where it is a thrill.
It is a business, in its infancy and rapidly developing. It is the newest
form of transportation, which means new markets and new thinkirng.
It has romance, which makes it more interesting as a business.
The atomic bomb will make people in large cities think of decentralization and decentralization will make more transportation.
Air transportation will connect Denver with all the rest of the
world. In a few months Denver will be less than sixty hours by air from
every major city in the world.
How will air transportation help the lawyer? It will help the lawyer generally as it adds to the development of the city. The prosperity
of a city depends upon its transportation. No transportation means no
communication, which means no business. Air transportation will help
the community in proportion to its use. Denver depends more than any
other city on air transportation. It has obstacles of terrain which it is
overcoming and it has a future of greatness in air transportation. If
Denver becomes prosperous, its citizens will become prosperous and the
lawyer will participate in the city's prosperity. Therefore, the lawyer
will encourage air transportation so as to add to the general prosperity
of the city.
'17 Comp. Gen. 1039. "Real Estate-Rights of Way-Rio Grande Canalization Project."
.
3MAll decisions, administrative rulings and articles extant to September, 1944, are
cited herein.
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The difficulties of air transportation are being overcome. Air transportation is more than one hundred times as safe now as it was at the
conclusion of World War I. Eventually air transportation will be the
safest and cheapest mode of transportation, and when it is safest and
cheapest, it will be purchased.
The auto has developed much business for the lawyer, such as damage suits, insurance business, etc. Likewise, the air lines will develop
business for the lawyers. They too will have contracts, damage suits,
insurance business, and many other types of legal business requiring representation by lawyers. Air lines might take lawyers into executive positions. Terrell Drinkwater, a Denver lawyer, is now vice-president of
one of the major air lines in the United States.
Airplanes to a great extent create their own business. Some people
make a quick trip by plane when had they had to rely upon slower
methods of transportation they could never make the trip. The airplane
increases rather than cuts into the business of other carriers. It creates
business because it saves time and the more time it saves the more time
there is for business and thus the more business.
The World Fair of Aviation is scheduled to be held in July in
Omaha, in connection with the National Aeronautics Association's first
post-war convention. Many foreign nations have been invited to exhibit
their latest equipment.
In response to a question as to what increased facilities Denver
needs, Mr. Acker stated that there was a need for expansion of the Denver Municipal Airport and plans for an enlarged administration building
have been completed. There is also need for more private flyer facilities.
There will never be any necessity of increasing the size of the air field
because the planes of the future will require less space for landings and
take-offs. This will be due in part to the reverse pitch propeller and
rocket assistance. Of course, the plans of the Denver airport will have
to fit in with the national plans and needs. The time will come when
every city will have a downtown air terminal. Denver will need several
private fields adjacent to the residehtial sections, but these should not be
so located as to cut down residential expansion. Denver needs a field for
model planes and gliders.
In answer to a question regarding the prospects of Denver in national and international traffic, Mr. Acker stated that Denver would get
none of the East-West transcontinental traffic. However, Denver is on
the great circle route known as the Sunshine International Route from
South America through Texas, Denver, Canada, Alaska, Russia and to
China and Japan. This is a more feasible route to the Orient than going
through California, as it reduces the distance 400 miles. Denver has
been declared an air gateway by the Civil Aeronautics Board. Travel to
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the Orient through the southwestern part of the United States would
go through Denver.
Mr. Acker also was asked how air transportation would affect
freight transportation and he replied that mass production of the airplane and mass consumption of air transportation will reduce costs. The
time will come when heavy freight can be shipped by air economically.
The greatest possibilities are in the shipment of tropical fruit from South

America. It can be shipped in here and consumed within a few hours,
thereby reducing costs of packing and loss of spoilage.

Recent Judicial Modification of Habitual
Criminal Act
BY WILLIAM E. DOYLE*
A few weeks ago the Colorado Supreme Court had occasion to
reverse a case in which the defendant had been charged and convicted of
violating the habitual criminal statute. Although the act has been
changed 1 since the conviction of the defendant in that case, it is believed
that the decision is of sufficient interest to warrant brief comment in
view of the substantial similarity between the old law and the new one
and in view of some of the other implications of this recent Supreme
Court pronouncement. The decision referred to is O'Day L. People, No.
15638, Public Ledger, Jan. 19, 1946.
The information charged the defendant, William O'Day, with the
offense of aggravated robbery. The second and third counts of the information charged prior convictions under the burglary statutes of California and Missouri. Upon being arraigned, the defendant admitted
that he was the identical person who had been convicted of burglary in
California and Missouri. Such an admission is equivalent to a plea of
guilty under the habitual criminal statute. 2 The remaining issue, i. e.,
whether the defendant was guilty of the immediate offense, was submitted to a jury. The verdict of the jury was guilty of the offense of
aggravated robbery. Pursuant to this verdict and the previous pleas of
guiltq, the trial court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment.
A cursory examination of the history of the habitual criminal statute indicates that cases which have been filed under this act have not
*Of the Denver bar.
'Chapter 114, Session Laws of Colo.. 1945.
2-Section
554, Chapter 48, 1935 C. S. A. provides in part as follows:
"Whereupon the court in which such last conviction was had shall cause the.
said person, * * * to be brought before it and shall inform him of the. allegations
contained in such information and of his rights to be tried as to the truth thereof
according to law, and shall require such offender to say whether he is the same
person as charged in such information or not. If he says he is not the same person
or remains silent, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty."
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fared too well in our Supreme Court. The act, which was passed in
1929,' provides generally for aggravated punishment for second and
subsequent offenders. In the case of a second offense, the term is not less
than one-third the longest term prescribed upon a first conviction. For
a third conviction, the term of imprisonment is not less than the longest
term nor more than three times the longest term prescribed upon a first
conviction. 4 One who has been three times convicted previously must
be sentenced to life imprisonment.
In the case of Smalley v. People, 96 Colo. 361, 43 P. (2d) 385,
the court in construing this act laid down the requirement that where
the district attorney at the time of filing the information knows of prior
convictions, he must allege them or waive his right to proceed thereafter
under the habitual criminal statute.
More recently the court had occasion to reverse another case in
which the defendant had been charged with being an habitual criminal.
This was Wolf v.. People, 111 Colo. 46, 137 P. (2d) 693, 695. Here
the trial court had ordered two separate trials, one on the immediate substantive offense and the second to determine whether the defendant had
committed previous felonies. The ruling on appeal was that no legal
basis existed for the separate trials-that the trial court should have
5
proceeded to try the entire case as one.
The original act and the one under consideration have now been
changed in an important particular. Formerly, it took into account only
a limited number of more serious felonies. The present act is much
broader. It declares that persons previously convicted of any felony shall
8
be tried and prosecuted under the habitual criminal statute.
In the principal case the court expressed doubt as to whether the
trial judge had sentenced the defendant pursuant to the provisions of
the aggravated robbery statute or in accordance with the habitual
criminal statute.
'L. '29, p. 309, Secs. 1-5, Secs. 551-555, Ch. 48, 1935 C. S. A.
'In the principal case, although the Supreme Court expressed doubt as to whether
the accused had been sentenced under the robbery statute or under the habitual criminal
statute, it would appear that the trial court proceeded under the latter act. Undoubtedly, the trial court felt that it was required to sentence the accused to life in prison,
since that is the maximum sentence for the offense of aggravated robbery.
'It would seem that the statute does in fact contemplate separate trials. It reads in
pertinent part as follows (Sec. 554, Ch. 48, 1935 C. S. A.) :
"If at any time after conviction and either before or after sentence it shall
appear that a person convicted of a felony has previously been convicted of a crime
or crimes as set forth in any of the three foregoing sections, it shall be the duty of
the district attorney * * * to file an information in such case accusing the said
person of such previous conviction or convictions." (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus it would appear that the legislature had intended that action under the habitual
criminal statute should be taken only after conviction of the immediate substantive
offense.
8
Sec. 1, Ch. 114, L. '45.
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"We have examined the sentence and there is nothing therein
which indicates whether the sentence imposed was pronounced
under the provisions of section 551, 552, and 554, supra, o
whether under the provisions of section 84, Chapter 48, '35
C. S. A."
If the sentence was pronounced under Section 84, Ch. 48, 1935
C. S. A., i. e., the robbery statute, it was held to be defective because
it did not include both a minimum and a maximum sentence. The
court construed the words "not less than two years, or for life," which
words are contained in the aggravated robbery statute to mean not less
than two years nor more than life and thus tb be subject to Section
545, Ch. 48, 1935 C. S. A., which provision requires7 that the court
pronounce both a minimum and a maximum sentence.
"It is a general rule of construction that criminal statutes
shall be strictly construed, and in accordance therewith, we hold
that the penalty authorized under section 84, supra, is for a term
.of two years to life. The section does not authorize the imposition of a specific life sentence and if the-trial court construed it as
authorizing the imposition of such a sentence, it committed error."8
The second and final phase of the decision involves a construction
of the so-called habitual criminal statute. It was held that if the court
sentenced the defendant pursuant to Section 552, i. e., the habitual
criminal statute, it erred in not ascertaining whether the prior convictions
were offenses of the grade of felony. It was said:
"If the court was of the opinion that it might impose a life
sentence under section 552, supra, there likewise was error committed for there is no such proof of former convictions as would
authorize this action. It should be noted that the defendant here
admitted his identity. We believe it was the positive duty of the
court to make inquiry as to the offenses for which defendant had
theretofore been convicted. We do not take judicial notice of the
laws or statutes of other states; they must be proved in the same
manner as other facts in the case."
The sum and substance of the decision is found in the above language. In other words, it will no longer be possible for the trial court
simply to ascertain whether the accused is the same person who was
tried and convicted of the prior offenses. In the future the district attorney will have to prove that the prior convictions were in fact felonies
'By its terms this section does not apply to a life sentence. It provides in part:
"When a convict is sentenced to the state penitentiary, otherwise than for life,
for an offense or crime committed after the passage of this subdivision * * *
(Emphasis supplied.)
'From a reading of the entire case, it would seem to be amply clear that the trial
court sentenced the defendant under the habitual criminal statute and not the -robbery
statute. It is suggested, therefore, that this phase of the decision is obiter.
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regardless of whether the accused has attempted to plead guilty. This,
it is believed, is a fair requirement because crimes vary from state to
state even though their designations are the same. Furthermore, the
accused is not always in a position to know whether his act constitutes
a felony under the laws of the state in which he is presently being tried.
In support of this assertion it is pointed out that even when an accused
pleads guilty, it is customary for the court to require the district attorney to produce evidence establishing the elements of the offense charged.
In fact, there is a statute in Colorado which requires the court to examine witnesses as to the aggravation and mitigation of the offense.,,
A consequence of this phase of the decision will be hesitancy on the
part of trial courts to proceed under the habitual criminal act unless the
proof of former convictions is clear and convincing.
One other result of this decision is that in the future a straight
life sentence may not be imposed. It will be necessary in every case to
pronounce a minimum and maximum limitation on the term. Presumably a sentence of ninety years to life would satisfy this requirement.
It would seem that this aspect of the decision might be of consequence
to those persons who are now serving life sentences for aggravated
robbery, forcible rape or second degree murder. For these convicts, the
decision could provide a key to the door of the penitentiary. It is not
possible to forecast a decision on the question of whether such a sentence is void or voidable, and whether such a person can be re-sentenced
or whether the trial court will have lost jurisdiction to correct a defective sentence. In any event, these are questions which will certainly be
posed to courts in the near future, and until the matter is settled, an
epidemic of petitions and motions is anticipated.
Perhaps more noteworthy than either of the above comments is
the policy of our Supreme Court which is to be inferred from this and
the prior decisions cited hereinabove, to scrutinize carefully all prosecutions under the habitual criminal statute. This, it is suggested, is a
praiseworthy approach to the problem for the reason that the statute
is a harsh one. It robs the trial judge of all discretion in imposing sentence. The legislature usurps the sentencing function, and it does so
not on the basis of the particular facts, but purely on the record of
former convictions. Granted that there ought to be statutory provision
for increased punishment for habitual offenders, the power to declare
the minimum and maximum sentences should remain in the trial judge.
It is he and not the legislature who is in a position to evaluate the
facts and to reach a just conclusion.
A further defect in the law is apparent. As now written it makes
no distinction between a vicious gangster and a casual offender, a socalled constitutional psychopath. Therefore, it is now possible for a
9

Sec. 482, Ch. 48, 1935 C. S. A.
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district attorney to adopt the attitude that all third and fourth offenders should be prosecuted as habitual criminals. Such a practice could
result in great injustice where, as we have demonstrated, the legislature
has previously pronounced sentence, leaving the trial judge powerless
in the matter.
How can these conditions be remedied? First, it is suggested that
the act be amended so that the trial judge will have a broad discretion
in pronouncing sentence. Secondly, the law should not include all
felonies, but should be limited to particular selected ones, such as kidnapping, robbery, rape, mayhem, etc.
It has been suggested above that the harshness of this statute
moves the court to consider strictly cases arising under it. If the trial
judge were allowed more discretion, perhaps there would be fewer
reversals.

Newly Admitted Members of the Bar
William V. Webb, admitted Feb. 1946 on motion. A.B. Univ.
of Denver, LL.B. Univ. of Texas 1933, member Beta Theta Pi and
Phi Delta Phi. Was engaged in general practice of law in Dallas, Texas,
1933-1940. Was in army 1940-1946, leaving it as lt. col. in the Inspector General's Dept. Was last with headquarters of Tenth Army in
Okinawa. Mr. Webb is officing at 828 Symes Bldg., Denver, and is particularly intcrested in the fields of oil and gas and corporations.
James F. Price, admitted Feb. 1946 on motion. B.S. Kansas State
College 1927, LL.B. Stanford 1930, LL.M. Stanford 1937. Member
Delta Theta Phi. Has had experience as trust officer, member of security
and brokerage firm and New York Stock Exchange. Is now dean of the
schools of Law and Commerce, University of Denver, 211 15th St.,
Denver. Is particularly interested in the field of public law, particularly
labor law.
Gordon A. Nicholson, admitted Jan. 1946 on motion. Studied at
University of Utah, LL.B. George Washington University 1935. Member of Sigma Pi. Was on the law review staff, and has the Order of the
Coif. Served as ten years as special agent and special agent in charge,
FBI. He is with the D. & R. G. W., 1531 Stout St., Denver, He is
particularly interested in the fields of transportation, personal injury,
criminal and taxation law.
Harold Edward Hafer, admitted Feb. 1946 on motion. Studied
at Colorado Univ. 1929-1932, B.S. Univ. of Oklahoma 1933, LL.B.
Univ. of Oklahoma 1936. Member of Sigma Pi. Admitted to Oklahoma bar in 1936. General practice in Chickasha, Oklahoma, 19361942. Asst. Prosecuting Attorney, Grady County, 1939-1942. FBI
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1942-1946. Is now residing in Denver, but expects to open offices in
the Wilson Bldg., Fort Collins, April 1946. Is particularly interested
in real estate and probate fields.
Woodruff B. Cram, admitted Feb. 1946 on motion. LL.B. Detroit
College of Law 1928. Admitted to Michigan bar 1929. Was in Highland Park Trust Co. 1928-1931. Practiced in own office in Detroit
from 1932 to 1945. Is now Associate District Price Attorney, OPA.
Expects to open own office in Denver at conclusion of government program. Interested in fields of wills, estates, corporations, real estate, negligence and labor law.
Earl A. Wolvington, admitted on examination Feb. 1946. A.B.
Univ. of Nebraska 1939, LL.B. Univ. of Nebraska 1940. Admitted to
Nebraska bar 1940. Member Phi Alpha Delta. Served in army from
1941 to Jan. 1946. Was overseas in India and Africa for 34 months.
Served as trial judge advocate or defense counsel on various courts martial in Tunis and Casablanca. Was commanding officer of a quartermaster truck company with rank of captain. Is in general practice in
association with Raymond M. Sandhouse, Foote Bldg., Sterling.
William D. Wright, III, admitted on examination Feb. 1946. A.B.
magna cum laude Univ. of Colorado 1938, LL.B. Yale 1942. Member
of Beta Theta Pi and Phi Beta Kappa. Played varsity baseball. Special
agent FBI March 1942 to Dec. 1945. Is practicing law with father, W.
D. Wright, Jr., 722 Symes Bldg., Denver. Interested in trusts, business
law, bills and notes.
Hunter D. Hardeman, Jr., admitted on examination Feb. 1946.
B.A. Texas A. &%
M. 1943, Univ. of Texas, LL.B. Univ. of Colorado
1945. Member Pi Kappa Alpha. Was on law review staff and vicepresident student bar association at Colorado Univ. Is a partner with
Frank H. Hall in the firm of Hall and Hardeman, First National Bank
Bldg., Trinidad. Interested in real property law and negotiable instruments.
James J. Johnston, admitted on examination Feb. 1946. B.A.
Univ. of Iowa 1944, J.D. Univ. of Iowa 1945. Member of Phi Delta
Theta and Phi Delta Phi, Was president of both of these fraternities
and also of the Iowa Memorial Union Board. He is not definitely located. Is interested in the fields of corporation and labor law and would
prefer to enter general practice with special emphasis on these fields.
H. Harold Calkins, admitted Feb. 1946 on examination. A.B.
Cornell College 1938, LL.B. Northwestern 1940. Member Phi Delta
Phi, Phi Beta Kappa. On Illinois Law Review staff. Was in the FBI
five and one-half years. Associated with Phelps and Phelps and Benjamin E. Sweet, E. & C. Bldg., Denver.
Virgil Albert Lininger, admitted on examination Feb. 1946.
LL.B. Westminster Law School 1942. Was Assistant to the Manager,
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Hawaiian Dredging Co., Ltd., Honolulu. Now located at 1405 Glenarm St., Denver.
Minoru Yasui, admitted on examination Jan. 1946. B.A. Univ.
of Oregon 1937, LL.B. Univ. of Oregon 1939, studied at Denver Univ.
1945. Practiced in Oregon 1939-1942. Member Phi Beta Kappa. Now
in general practice in association with Toshio Ando, 615 E. &'C. Bldg.,
Denver.
Charles F. Cory, admitted under special soldier rule Feb. 1946.
B.S. in Com. Univ. of Denver 1938, LL.B. Washburn 1941. Vicepresident of law school 1940. Admitted Kansas bar 1941. Was professional musician. Served in army 1941-1946. Was major. Served on
Third Army Staff in invasion of France and in Luxembourg and Germany. Is now Assistant Attorney General of Colorado. Is interested in
taxation, wills and estates, and real property.
Lon J. Putnam, admitted under special soldier rule Feb. 1946.
B.A. Baylor 1938, LL.B. Univ. of Texas 1941. Entered army immediately after passing Texas bar examination in June 1941. Was discharged as a major Dec. 1945. Is not at present definitely located.
Would like to associate with established firm for experience.
John Edward Morrison, admitted under special soldier rule 1945.
Univ. of Denver 1934-1937, LL.B. Westminster Law School 1940.
Member Alpha Kappa Psi. Has had three years accounting work, two
years Assistant Credit Manager Crane-O'Fallon Co., 1631 15th St.,
Denver, where he is at present. In Sept. 1940 enlisted U. S. N. R. Commissioned ensign 1941. Reported for active duty Sept. 1941. Was in
Hawaiian area at time of Pearl Harbor attack. Served four and one-half
years in navy (three and one-half years overseas), on the Chicago,
Astoria, Yorktown, Enterprise, Saratoga, Bunker Hill, Essex and Pittsburgh. Was on the Yorktown at the Battle of Midway when the ship
was abandoned. Is interested in the fields of corporation and business
law.
Benjamin Franklin Stapleton, Jr., admitted under special soldier
rule Dec. 1945. B.A. (Bus.) Univ. of Colorado 1939, LL.B. Yale
1942. Member Chi Psi, Phi Delta Phi, Corbey Court. Served 45
months in navy, most recently as navigator aboard the U. S. S. Shea in
the Pacific theater until it was hit by suicide plane at Okinawa. Interested in estates and corporation law. Associated with Ireland & Ireland,
Midland Savings Bldg., Denver.
Hyman A. Coggan, admitted under special soldier rule Feb. 1946.
B.A. Univ. of Denver 1940, LL.B. Univ. of Denver 1942. Member
Phi Sigma Delta, Sigma Phi Alpha, Skull and Bones. Worked way
through school and supported family by operating barber and beauty
shop. Would like to associate with established firm. Offices at 703 Security Bldg., Denver.
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W. Russel Eddy, admitted under special soldier rule Dec. 1945.
A.B. Univ. of Denver 1940, LL.B. Univ. of Denver 1942, Cornell University, certificate of completion 1943 (personnel psychology, army specialized training program). Member Lambda Chi Alpha. In college
participated in band, glee club and track. Is registered pharmacist in
Colorado with nine years experience. Was personnel consultant with
army two years. Is now in general practice associated with Fred Harding, 624 E. & C. Bldg., Denver.
Donald Carl McKinley, admitted on examination Feb. 1946. A.B.
Dartmouth 1937, J.D. University of Chicago 1940. Member Phi
Gamma Delta and Casque and Gauntlet. College activities included
varsity basketball, Barrett Cup, Palaeopitus. He was admitted to
Illinois Bar in 1940. Served four years U.S.N.R. on sub chasers and
destroyers and was released Jan. 7, 1945 as It. Is interested in real
estate, labor law and trial practice. He is associated with Means Z3 Isbill,
902 Midland Savings Bldg., Denver.

Our Returning Lawyer-Veterans
Donald S. Stubbs, It. (j.g.), U. S. N. R., served from Aug. 1944
to March 1946 in the American, European-African, and Asiatic-Pacific
theaters. He has returned to practice with the firm of Lewis and Grant,
1030 First National Bank Bldg., Denver.
Teller Ammons, It. col., C. M. P., A. U. S., served from April
1942 to Dec. 1945 in the U. S. and Pacific. He was attached to the Marines for overseas duty, and received the Legion of Merit. He has returned to practice in his office at 608 Midland Savings Bldg., Denver.
Frederick T. Henry, major, Judge Advocate General's department,
served from March 1942 to March 1946 in the United States, England.
France, Germany and Belgium. He has returned to practice with offices
at 218 Mining Exchange Bldg., Colorado Springs.
Jerome R. Strickland, It. col., Army Air Forces, served from Jan.
1941 to March 1946 in the U. S., France and Austria. In the U. S. he
served with the training command, and in France and Austria with a
B-26 group. He received the air medal with two clusters, three campaign
stars, and the ETO ribbon. He has returned to practice with the firm of
Strickland and Strickland, with offices at 425 Denver National Bank
Bldg., Denver.
Roy E. Montgomery, sk 2/c, U. S. N. R., served from March 1944
to Nov. 1945 in the Pacific, on duty aboard the U. S. S. Noble, A. P. A.
218. He has returned to practice with offices at 752 Gas and Electric
Bldg., Denver.
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Charles F. Stewart, capt., J. A. G. D., served from May 1942 to
Jan. 1946 in the North African Middle Eastern theater. He received
the Soldier's Medal. He has now returned to practice with his firm of
Porter, Stewart and Carroll at Gunnison. Mr. Stewart is a former president of the Gunnison Chamber of Commerce and is now a candidate for
mayor in the spring election.
William Grant, lt. com., U. S. N. R., served from June 1942 to
Nov. 1945 in the Pacific theater. He has returned to practice with the
firm of Grant, Shafroth and Toll, with offices in the Equitable Bldg.,
Denver.
Charles H. Haines, Jr., It. (j.g.), Supply Corps, U. S. N. R., served
from Nov. 1943 to Feb. 1946 in the American and Pacific-Asiatic theaters, attached to the Fleet Supply Office Com. Serv. Pac. He has returned
to practice with the firm of Grant, Shafroth and Toll, 730 Equitable
Bldg., Denver.
Fred N. Holland, major, Adjutant General's department, served
from Feb. 1943 to June 1946 in the Office of Dependency Benefits at
Newark, N. J. While on duty with the Office of Dependency Benefits
he was officer in charge of the Fraud Section of the Field Investigations
Branch. Major Holland attended the University of Idaho and graduated from the University of Denver School of Law in 1924. Before
entering service he was a member of the firm of Berman Z3 Holland.
He is now attorney in the branch office for area 13 of the Veterans
Administration in Denver.
John M. Evans, lt. comdr., Navy, served from June 1942 to Jan.
1946 in the American theater. He is now in the office of the Attorney
General, State Capitol Bldg., Denver.
Mary C. Griffith, It. (j. g.), U. S. N. R., served from Sept. 1943
to March 1946, during which period she was stationed in the Bureau
of Naval Personnel, Washington, D. C., in the Welfare Division, Family
Allowance Section. She was officer in charge of reconsideration, sub unit
for class B (parents, brothers, and sisters), family allowances and also
served in sub unit class A (wives and children) family allowances.
Before entering the service she was attorney for Kershaw, Swinerton 1&
Wahlburg, general contractors for the Rocky Mountain Arsenal. She
will resume the practice of law with her brothers, John L. Griffith,
clerk of the Denver County Court, and Capt. James E. Griffith, now
with the A. M. G. stationed at Regenburg, Germany, under the firm
name Griffith Z4 Griffith, with offices at 701 Midland Savings Bldg.
Charles Elwood Bradley, seaman 1/c, Navy, served from March
1945 to March 1946 in the U. S. Naval Ammunition Z4 Net Depot,
Seal Beach, Calif. During this period he was court martial yeoman. HE
has returned to practice in his own office at Steamboat Springs wherE
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he practiced for six years prior to entering the service. He was admitted
to the Colorado bar in March 1939 after graduating from the University
of Colorado. He was candidate for district attorney of the 14th Judicial
District in 1944.

Personals
Charles Rosenbaum, Denver, has been elected president of the
Allied Jewish Council of Denver. The council is the local fund-raising
organization for charity and relief among associated Jewish organizations.
William E. Doyle, Denver, recently discharged from the army as a
second lieutenant, and a former deputy district attorney, has been appointed registrar of Westminster Law School to succeed John E. Nelsdn,
who has been registrar for twenty years. Mr. Nelson has been appointed
registrar emeritus.
Comm. Bentley M. McMullin, USNR, Denver, legal officer for the
12th Naval District, San Francisco, has been assigned to duty in Tokyo
to participate in the prosecution of Japanese war criminals. This will
take about six months, after which Comm. McMullin expects to return
to practice in Denver. Comm. McMullin was assigned to duty in the
Judge Advocate General's Office in 1941 and saw duty during the North
African invasion. He has served in the United States, New Orleans, New
York ,Washington and San Francisco, in various legal capacities.
Vernon V. Ketring and Alex B. Holland have formed a partnership
and are practicing under the name Ketring and Holland, with offices at
1019 Midland Savings Bldg., Denver.
T. Raber Taylor has opened his own office for the practice of law
at 404 First National Bank Bldg., Denver.
Herman W. Seaman and Conrad L. Ball have formed a partnership
and are practicing under the firm name of Seaman Z' Ball, with offices at
204 First National Bank Bldg., Loveland.
The firm of Hindry, Friedman & Brewster has been dissolved.
Guy K. Brewster is officing at 1011 University Bldg., Denver, and Hayes
R. Hindry at 429 University Bldg., Denver.
Kenaz Huffman, Sherman Sutliff and Ranger Rogers have formed
the firm of Huffman, Sutliff & Rogers, with offices at 411 E. & C. Bldg.,
Denver. This firm succeeds the 25-year-old firm of Yeaman, Gove &4
Huffman.
Joseph E. Newman has resigned as assistant U. S. District Attorney
to resume private practice in Denver. He will be succeeded by Joseph N.
Lilly, former assistant U. S. District Attorney, who has recently been
discharged from the army.
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Claude W. Blake, state senator from Denver, has been elected president of the Colorado Children's Aid Society and the City Temple Institutional Society.
Lt. James J. Patterson, Denver, will act as one of three defense
attorneys in the trial of four Japanese accused of cruel and brutal offenses
against American prisoners in Yokohama. Lt. Patterson is a former
assistant Attorney General of Colorado.
Donald Lorenz, formerly associated with Schaetzel and Knight in
Denver, has opened his own office for the practice of law in Steamboat
Springs and Oak Creek.
Paul A. Hentzell, Denver, has resigned as assistant city attorney
to devote his entire time to his own practice. Mr. Hentzell was prosecutor in police court for several months, and has recently handled city
appeal cases to the county court.
Philip B. Gilliam, juvenile judge of Denver, has been elected vicepresident of the west central area council of the Y. M. C. A. The position places him on the policy board of forty Y. M. C. A. groups in a
seven state area including Colorado.
Shields Mason, recently returned from service, has opened his own
office for the practice of law at 450 Equitable Bldg., Denver, phone
TAbor 2977.
Henry Stark, formerly of Denver and recently returned from service, has associated with James B. Garrison in Cortez.
Donald D. Keim, Denver, manager of the Colorado State Chamber
of Commerce, has been elected president of the Denver Rotary Club.
Worth Alien, Denver, has been elected treasurer of the Colorado
Tuberculosis Association.
Ralph L. Carr, president of the Denver Bar Association, has been
appointed as people's interest director of the Federal Home Loan Bank
of Topeka.
Col. Charles C. Young, Denver, has been appointed Judge
Advocate for the 9th Service Command. Col. Young entered the army
in August, 1940, and was in charge of the Manila court martial of
General Yamashita, and has recently returned to the United States
after 30 months overseas.
Edward C. Day has been appointed director of the Denver rent
area, over the rent areas administered from the Denver rent offices. He
has recently returned to the OPA after.serving in the navy.
John 0. Rames, Denver, recently returned from service, has been
appointed chief of adjudication for disability insurance claims in the
Veterans Administration, branch 13 office.
District Judge William A. Black, Denver, was re-elected president
of the Old Timers Baseball Association of Colorado to serve for the
fourth consecutive year.
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Admitted to a Higher Court
James A. Marsh, prominent Denver attorney and political figure,
died recently in his home in Denver from a heart attack. Although
not in the best of health during recent weeks, Mr. Marsh had been up
and about until shortly before his death. He came to Denver in 1909
and was named city attorney in 1915, which position he held until
1923. After serving as Democratic state chairman he was elected
Democratic national committeeman in 1.934, which position he held
until his death. In 1926 he was elected president of the Denver Bar
Association.
Dudley W. Strickland, Denver, died at the age of 74 in the hospital after a lmg illness. He came to Colorado in 1898. He graduated
from Williams College and Denver University School of Law. He was
born in Cincinnati and spent much of his boyhood in Aspen. He was a
member of the Loyal Legion and the Mile High Club. He was associated in the law practice with his two sons, Jerome and Dudley, Jr.,
both of whom have recently returned to practice after service in the
armed forces.
Benjamin R. Kobey died at the age of 71 after an illness of
several weeks. Born in England, he came to Colorado in 1887 and
graduated from the University of Colorado in 1898. He practiced law
in Aspen for a number of years.
Walter R. Crose, practicing attorney in Montrose, died at Wilmette,
Illinois, while there on a visit. Mr. Crose was formerly city attorney
for Montrose and a deputy district attorney and at the time of his death
was a member of the board of governors of the Colorado Bar
Association.
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New Members of Denver Bar Association
The following were admitted to membership in the Denver Bar
Association at the March 4, 1946, meeting:
H. Harold Calkins
Ben Bozeman
James B. Day
Leonard M. Crowley
Vance R. Dittman, Jr.
The following were admitted to membership at the April 1, 1946,
meeting:
Hyman A. Coggan
John M. Evans
Ralph H. Coyte
Leon Harvell
Woodruff B. Cram
James F. Price
Wilbur F. Denious, Jr.
J. Nelson Truitt

Denver Bar Association Nominations
The Nominating Committee of the Denver Bar Association, consisting of Robert E. More, chairman, Floyd F. Walpole, Percy S. Morris,
Richard Tull and Ernest B. Fowler, has made the following nominations for the association year beginning July 1, 1946:
For President --------------------------------- John E. G orsuch
For First Vice-President -----------------Langdon H. Larwill
For Second Vice-President --------------Kenneth M. Wormwood
For Trustees (two to serve three
James Quigg Newton, Jr.
..
.
years) .
Samuel S. Ginsberg
The annual election will be held on May 6th.

New Denver Bar Association Committees
President Ralph L. Carr announces the appointment of two new
committees of the Denver Bar Association. The committee to handle the
problem of on-the-job training program for veterans taking training in
law offices consists of:
•
Charles A. Baer, Chairman, Colorado National Bank, Denver 17
James F. Price, 211 15th St., Denver 2
John R. Turnquist, 931 14th St., Denver 2
The committee to study the economic condition of the bar, particularly with reference to minimum and suggested fee schedule, consists of:
Hugh B. Kellogg, Chairman, 808 E. 1&C. Bldg., Denver 2
Ira L. Quiat, 415 Symes Bldg., Denver 2
William R. Newcomb, 620 E. & C. Bldg., Denver 2
Gilbert L. McDonough, 414 Equitable Bldg., Denver 2
Stephens Park Kinney, 1004 Patterson Bldg., Denver 2
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Vacation Schedules
For Denver District Court
The following are the vacation schedules for the Denver District
Judges for the year 1946:
Civil Division
June 24th to July 6th, Judge Joseph J. Walsh.
July 8th to July 20th, Judge Henry S. Lindsley.
July 22nd to August 3rd, Judge William A. Black.
August 5th to August 17th, Judge Joseph A. Luxford.
August 19th to August 3 1st, Judge Charles C. Sackmann.
Criminal Division
June 10th to July 20th, Judge Joseph E. Cook.
July 22nd to August 3 1st, Judge Robert W. Steele.
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